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ABSTRACT
During an undergraduate college career, an accounting major devotes a great part of his or her
time to learning how publicly traded businesses prepare financial statements in compliance
with Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) and federal securities laws. These
accounting principles, standards, and procedures are ultimately enforced by the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to protect investors, uphold fair markets, and
promote public trust in the capital market system. To fulfill its mission, the SEC Division of
Enforcement conducts investigations into possible violations of the federal securities laws and
administers enforcement actions. Naturally, SEC investigations and the anticipation of
potential enforcement actions have an impact on stock prices and shareholder wealth when
they become public knowledge. This capstone research project applies an event study
methodology commonly used in finance and accounting research to examine the timing and
magnitude of the impact of 51 financial reporting-related SEC enforcement releases from
April 2014 through March 2017. Specifically, the statistical methodology is applied to assess
the shareholder response with regard to the company targeted, its main competitor, and the
nature of the violation. On average, the targeted companies, particularly those with relatively
small market capitalizations, earned highly statistically significant negative abnormal returns.
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INTRODUCTION
During a typical undergraduate college career as an accounting major, students learn about the
accounting principles, standards, and procedures that corporations use to prepare their
financial statements in compliance with Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP)
and federal securities laws. In other words, students learn how ethical, transparent
corporations follow the rules. Despite their training, it is difficult for accounting majors to
prepare adequately for a dynamic economic and regulatory environment where financial
reporting and adherence to GAAP are more convoluted, fluid, and consequential. This
traditional research thesis seeks to determine the real-world stakes of financial reporting in
today’s business context by studying the impact of recent Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) financial reporting probes on shareholder wealth. The following research
questions outline the scope of this inquiry.

Research Questions
1. What is the impact of a financial reporting-related SEC investigation on the stock
price of the targeted company? (Timing, Direction, and Magnitude)
2. How do shareholders of an industry competitor respond?
3. What common violations has the SEC exposed in recent years and does the nature of
the violation matter regarding the impact on companies and/or competitors?

LITERATURE REVIEW
This literature review explores how publicly traded business entities have violated the
financial reporting rules in recent history and what the consequences are for stakeholders.
Specifically, this review centers on the impact that U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) financial reporting-related investigations and enforcement actions have on shareholder
wealth at the wayward firms and how the process pertains to the effective functioning of a
capital market system.
-2-

The Impact of Recent SEC Financial Reporting Probes on Shareholder Wealth:
Companies, Competitors, and Consequences
Senior Capstone Project for Stephen Warde

Accurate financial reporting is fundamental to the effective functioning of our market system.
Financial reporting fraud and even erroneous misstatements can cost investors and other
stakeholders money. According to the “Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases” page
on the SEC website, the number of enforcement actions brought by the commission is
increasing again, particularly those relating to financial reporting. The increases come as the
agency returns its focus to alleged financial reporting and disclosure problems that might have
gone unpunished during the financial crisis. (This study was performed toward the end of the
Obama administration’s period in office, a period in which regulatory compliance and
enforcement were emphasized. After the transfer of power to the Trump administration, there
is substantial doubt that the government will continue its support of robust SEC regulatory
efforts; therefore, the number of enforcement actions brought by the commission will likely
decrease in number). It is important to note that the new cases are on a smaller scale and
typically involve conduct that is far less egregious than the notorious accounting scandals of
the early 2000’s. This does not mean, however, that the misstatements are not important.

Before reviewing the literature concerning Securities and Exchange Commission enforcement
actions and consequences for financial misreporting, it is useful to understand how SEC
investigations begin and how the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) has impacted corporate
financial reporting. Feroz, Park, and Pastena (1991), publishing research in the Journal of
Accounting Research, provide a clear outline of the common leads that launch investigations.
The authors explain that, in addition to market surveillance programs connected to prominent
stock exchanges and ongoing SEC report analysis, “public complaints, tips, referrals from
other law enforcement agencies, and financial press information” are resources used to start
informal investigations (110-111). Although some leads may seem incriminating from the
beginning, the SEC does not normally inform the subject or the public during the early stages
of inquiry. This provides the commission with time and space to gather information and
decide whether a more formal investigation is necessary. It also protects innocent companies
from the adverse financial consequences of SEC disclosures and actions, as discussed in the
subsequent pages of this paper. Recent research by Rebecca Files (2012) augments the
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literature regarding the SEC’s Enforcement Division and their enforcement process. The
Enforcement Division oversees the enforcement process and enforcement actions, hereafter
referred to as Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases (AAER). Files notes: “The
enforcement process can be triggered by various events, including the voluntary
announcement of misconduct by the company, the delayed filing of an SEC report, the firing
of an auditor, or routine reviews by the SEC.” Files explains that if a formal investigation was
deemed necessary and subsequently performed (which can take months and even years), “the
SEC chooses between two possible paths of actions: (1) stop the investigation and take no
action, or (2) issue a formal enforcement action against the respondent(s).” These AAER’s
can result in monetary fines or disgorgement of gains for corporations or non-monetary
penalties and bars from serving in financial services for auditors, among other punishments.
It is evident that new AAER’s are on a smaller scale and typically involve conduct that is far
less egregious than the Enron and WorldCom accounting scandals, where financial fraud
rather than misstatements resulted in enormous overvaluations and spectacular stock market
collapses. This development is in part the result of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX).
Following the aforementioned scandals, public outrage evolved into investor dismay and a
pervasive skepticism throughout society; the public had doubts about the credibility of the
system of corporate financial reporting. The legislation and regulation enacted in response,
namely SOX, were measures taken to improve corporate governance by holding executives
accountable and to re-instill trust in the market system. This reaction resembles how the
creation of the Securities and Exchange Commission in 1934, as part of the Securities
Exchange Act, was designed to restore the public’s faith in capital markets and renew
economic prosperity during the Great Depression. Specifically, the purpose of the SOX Act is
to “protect investors by improving the accuracy and reliability of corporate disclosures made
pursuant to the securities laws.” Li, Pincus, and Rego (2008), publishing their research in The
Journal of Law and Economics, note that President George W. Bush pronounced the contents
of SOX as the “most far-reaching reforms of American business practices” since the Great
Depression. However, one must also be aware, as mentioned by Eccles, Grant, and Van Riel’s
article in Long Range Planning, that SOX has been controversial.
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Eccles, Grant, and Van Riel (2006) outline the main criticisms of the regulatory measures
enacted in the early 2000’s. The most obvious criticism is the added costs associated with
increased compliance efforts. A more subtle criticism involves shareholder wealth. Opponents
argue that SOX “has made management and boards averse to taking the kind of intelligent
risks that are necessary to create value for shareholders” (Eccles, Grant, and Van Riel). A
CFO Executive Board survey from 2006 cited by Eccles, et al. reveals that seventy percent of
global companies “had delayed new product introductions, postponed or cancelled
acquisitions, or shelved process improvements” because of the costs (time and resources)
associated with increased accounting discipline. SOX, therefore, has been a significant factor
in the increased relevance of and demand for thorough external audits, but many large
corporations lobby against these additional, comprehensive regulatory measures.

The federal securities laws, GAAP, and the SEC Division of Enforcement cannot prevent nor
detect all business fraud. The temptation to manipulate earnings – disguising losses and
inflating gains – to maximize stock prices has and will continue to be present and
consequential in a capital market system. One can look as far back as the speculative bubble
in Great Britain during the early eighteenth century having its origins in South Sea
Company’s intentional deceit of investors. Fast forward nearly three-hundred years to the
downfall of companies like Enron, and the rapid stock market rises and sudden collapses look
all too familiar. As evidenced by AAER’s levied by the SEC, companies are regularly
penalized for bribery and foreign corrupt practices, deficiencies in internal control over
financial reporting, general improper accounting practices resulting in misstatements, and
“earnings management” (overstating revenue, understating expenses, and both). In a society
that sensationalizes quarterly – short-term – earnings reports, earnings management may
momentarily maximize shareholder wealth, but this financial misrepresentation distorts the
allocation of resources and has a lasting impact on a firm’s performance and survivability.
Firms cited in the Securities and Exchange Commission’s AAERs experience negative capital
market consequences when the action becomes public knowledge. In addition, these firms are
-5-
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more likely to fail in the long-run. Researchers exploring AAERs and consequences of
earnings manipulation often refer to the pioneering work by Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney in
1996 and Feroz, Park, and Pastena in 1991. Dechow et al. quantified the average stock drop
that occurs on the date that SEC investigations become public knowledge – the date the
probes are disclosed in financial reports, press releases, or the media. The sample consisted of
92 firms that had allegedly violated GAAP between April 1982 and December 1992. The
stock price of these firms declined by 9 percent on the announcement date. This is comparable
to the -7.5% abnormal return on the AAER announcement date recorded by Feroz et al. in
1991. In addition to a loss of shareholder wealth for the wayward firms, the cost of capital
“increases substantially” (Dechow et al.). Although fundamental to understanding immediate
impacts of SEC probes into financial reporting irregularities, this research did not look
beyond a trading-week window and, as it relates to this capstone research project, it requires
an update given the significant changes in the securities and compliance environment since
the turn of the new millennium and, indeed, since the Great Recession.

Later research conducted by Feroz (extending his previous findings) in collaboration with
Leng, Cao, and Davalos (2011) explored long-term performance and failure risk of firms cited
in the AAERs. Their study examining 239 penalized firms found “significantly negative
abnormal stock returns in up to three years following AAERs” and noted negative operating
performance during this period. This 2011 study found that “average 1-year, 2-year, 3-year
abnormal returns after the AAER month are -12.97%, -23.68%, and -26.02%, respectively.”
Therefore, declines in shareholder wealth are even more severe in the years following an
AAER; the immediate drop in stock price is not normally recovered. Leng et al. conclude that
“ignoring the long-term stock price impact can substantially underestimate the economic
penalty the stock market imposes on AAER firms.” Leng et al.’s work also considered
implications regarding failure risk. Clearly, a declining stock price and increased costs of
capital can strain a company’s financial resources; SEC fines and reputational damage stem
from the AAER. Failure, for the purpose of this study, was bankruptcy and/or delisting from a
major stock exchange. The researchers found that “the failure rate of the AAER firms
(28.45%) is almost twice as high as that of the non-AAER firms (14.64%). The findings
-6-
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suggest that there are not only immediate, negative consequences of financial reporting
violations and investigations, but also lasting repercussions concerning a company’s
survivability.

Accounting misstatements and fraud are still prevalent in a post-SOX financial world. The
short- and long-term consequences of AAERs are significantly negative, so what motives for
earnings manipulation continue to trump integrity and transparency in corporate governance?
A study by Elayan, Li, and Meyer (2008) grapples with this question. The first and most
central reason is that the companies are not performing well. This can lead to earnings
manipulation primarily in the form of revenue-inflating in desperate, unethical firms. Elayan
et al. examined earnings per share (EPS) statistics for firms with accounting violations
compared with firms without these improprieties. They found that the median EPS for
wayward firms was $0.57 versus a median EPS of $0.90 for financially disciplined firms. This
poor operating performance often has negative outcomes for stock prices, and firms with
equity-based compensation for management can create dangerous incentives for earnings
manipulation; this is another reason “creative accounting” sometimes trumps financial
reporting integrity. Indeed, the same study documented that total equity-based compensation
for firms with accounting misstatements and/or fraud was 58.1% of total compensation. This
figure is about 13 percentage points above the equity-based compensation for firms not cited
in AAERs. Therefore, management compensation structures more dependent upon stock
performance seem more likely to undermine strategic, upstanding leadership and lead to
unethical accounting decisions. Clearly, these are findings that independent auditors and SEC
enforcement officials must keep in mind in order to be professionally skeptical in more
precarious audit situations and to more efficiently uncover financial reporting violations.
Kedia and Philippon provide a broader economic perspective in their article titled “The
Economics of Fraudulent Accounting.” In an intriguing addition to the existing accounting
research, the authors of this article explore the distortions in the allocation of resources,
namely labor and investment, due to unethical earnings management. In summary, Kedia and
Philippon explain that “managers of firms with low productivity not only manage earnings but
-7-
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also hire and invest too much in order to mimic good managers.” This practice was
epitomized by Enron and WorldCom in the early 2000’s. In fact, “publicly traded firms that
restated their earnings in 2000 and 2001 lost between 250,000 and 600,000 jobs” in the period
ending in 2002. The laborers in this example were part of an enormous fraud, and their efforts
were much less productive, in an economic sense, than they could have been if they had been
employed by a transparent, legitimately high-performing firm. Thus, the authors argue,
aggregate activity in an economy is below the optimum because at all times laborers
somewhere work for inefficient firms manipulating earnings and investors are fooled by
financial misreporting and consequently finance these unproductive companies. Although this
research does not address many of the macroeconomic implications, they are worth
consideration. So while declines in shareholder wealth are evident and underscore the
importance of discipline in both private and public accounting for capital markets there are
also ramifications for the larger economy in terms of allocation of resources.
Understanding why the Securities and Exchange Commission’s Enforcement Division targets
certain companies is relevant because it relates to the identification of likely sources of
potential misstatement and violations of the securities laws. SEC financial reporting probes
and the requirements established by various federal securities laws exist to strengthen the
foundation of the US capital markets and society’s trust in that system. In a well-developed
securities market constantly making decisions based on the information presented by publicly
traded companies, the independence and expertise of their auditors, the presence and
effectiveness of the SEC Enforcement Division and SEC laws, and the resulting financial
information circulated around the investing public need to be transparent and reliable. The
existing literature outlined and reviewed above quantifies the impact of investigations into
financial reporting violations before the twenty-first century. The data sources also highlight
the notion that internal controls and transparent financial reporting cannot be taken for
granted. Rather, adherence to GAAP and virtuous corporate governance are of critical
importance for the operations, stock performance, and survivability of a business.
Understanding the consequences of SEC investigations into shoddy or fraudulent accounting
may improve discipline and morale in public and private accounting. It will also, as
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accounting research from the past has suggested, benefit stakeholders and the economy as a
whole. This paper serves as a contemporary extension of this existing finance and accounting
research.

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
Research Questions:
1. What is the impact of a recent financial reporting-related SEC investigation on the
stock price of the targeted company? (Timing, Direction, and Magnitude)
2. How do shareholders in an industry competitor respond?
3. What common violations has the SEC exposed in recent years and does the nature of
the violation matter with regard to the companies and/or competitors?

To answer the research questions outlined above, the Event Study Methodology was applied.
Event Study
An event study in essence is a statistical method applied to assess the impact of an event on
the value of a firm. The event is specific news revealed to the investing public on a particular
day; in this instance, the event is the disclosure of a financial reporting-related SEC
investigation. It is not surprising that these investigations and the possibility of impending
enforcement actions impact expectations of profit and risk concerning the targeted company
and thus impact investor decision-making. The value of a targeted firm is measured by market
capitalization. Since the price per share multiplied by the number of outstanding shares equals
market capitalization, quantifying the stock price fluctuation as a result of the event provides a
reasonable estimation of the impact of a probe on shareholder wealth. The challenge arises
from the need to correct for broader stock market movements on and around the event date to
isolate the event’s impact.
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The price fluctuation of a targeted firm’s stock on its own is not particularly meaningful. The
stock’s price could change as a result of overall movement of the broader stock market on the
event date, not as a response to the disclosure of an SEC investigation. For this reason it is
necessary to determine a security’s expected return if there had not been an extraordinary
event. The magnitude and direction of this expected return depend on the degree to which the
firm’s stock generally moves with the broader market. This sensitivity to market movements
is reflected in the firm’s beta (β) coefficient, which once determined can be used to calculate
the expected return of the stock given any market return. For this study the Market Model is
used to determine each stock’s beta coefficient.
Market Model: rs = α + rm β + ε
Above rs is the return of the stock, α is the intercept, rm is the return of the market, β is the
sensitivity of the stock to market returns, and ε is a random error assumed to be normally
distributed with a mean of zero. This market model equation indicates how the return on a
firm’s stock reflects rises and falls in the overall stock market.
Again, in order to form an accurate prediction of a security’s expected return surrounding an
event date, the market model is employed. To ultimately determine the beta coefficient with
some accuracy, the researcher selects a 200-day measurement window over which the
correlation between the overall market and the selected stocks is analyzed. In this study the
Standard & Poor’s 500 stock market index (S&P 500) is used as a proxy – a baseline
reference – for overall market movements. A regression analysis in turn provides the
researcher with an estimation of the particular security’s sensitivity to S&P 500 index
movements. Certain stocks generally move in a one-to-one relationship with the overall
market; these stock would have a beta coefficient close to 1. Appendix D, a sample of raw
event study data for Avon Products, provides an example of a calculated beta of 0.925,
indicating that Avon’s stock generally moves in the same direction – according to the 200-day
measurement window – as the overall market. In addition the calculated beta of 0.925
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indicates that the magnitude of Avon’s stock movement is marginally less than that of the
overall market on a particular day. The point is that, with the beta coefficient determined from
the 200-day measurement window, a stock’s expected returns can be calculated in the
identified event windows because the researcher has established the security’s normal
correlation with the overall market.
To isolate investor reaction to the event, the researcher calculates the “abnormal returns” for
each day during the event window. The event window for this study begins 20 trading days
before the event date and ends 20 trading days after (a total of 41 days). The research
procedure to identify the event date, Day 0, is explained in the following section, “Research
Process.” The expected return on each day t (ERt) over the 41-day event window is calculated
as follows:
ERt = α + β rm,t

Where α and β are from the earlier estimated market model for each security and rm,t is the
actual return on the market (S&P500) on day t.

An abnormal return for each day t (ARt) is then computed as follows:
ARt = Rt – ERt

Where Rt is the actual return to the firm on each day t.
The direction, timing, and magnitude of the abnormal returns show the event’s impact on the
value of the firm, net of expected changes resulting from market movements. The abnormal
returns on the event date, Day 0, provide insights into the immediate stock price impact of
particular information concerning a company. The abnormal returns on Day 0 are most likely
to be attributable to the event and are most compelling when it comes to answering the
aforementioned research questions. Nonetheless, to capture a general short-term context and
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to find whether or not the event had a lasting impact, the researcher calculates cumulative
abnormal returns over three subsequent event windows. Although the abnormal returns on
subsequent days (Day 1, Day 2, Day 3,… Day 20) are influenced by the release of countless
bits of new information of interest to the investing public, the results – the magnitude of
cumulative abnormal returns over certain windows – still offer some perspective into the
short-term impact of a significant event. The cumulative abnormal returns are calculated over
three windows: from Day 0 to Day 2, Day 0 to Day 5, and Day 0 to Day 20. The cumulative
abnormal returns (CARs) are calculated by summing the abnormal returns of the individual
days in each window. Admittedly, there is a slightly more precise way of examining shortterm cumulative abnormal returns, but that method, referred to as compound cumulative
abnormal returns, was not employed for this iteration of the study.

Research Process
The research process begins on the Securities and Exchange Commission website, specifically
on the Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases page. Many CPAs, CPA firms, and
companies are subject to SEC enforcement actions each quarter, but the researcher is
concerned with publicly traded entities. There are forty-six companies with requisite historical
stock market data cited in SEC financial reporting-related enforcement releases from April
2014 through March 2017. Five companies currently under investigation but not yet charged
were added to the sample to gain insight into the impact of probes that may not even result in
penalties. This underscores that the study is concerned with the date that SEC probes first
become public knowledge.

The event date is the date on which a financial reporting-related SEC investigation into a
certain company is revealed to the public. The releases date is the date on which the SEC
administers the enforcement action, thus concluding the investigation and outlining the
punitive action. The event and release dates for the entire sample are shown in Appendix A.
The process of identifying the event date involves a careful examination of media releases
relating to the company prior to the enforcement action. Often media releases identified as the
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first disclosure of a probe to the public occur years before the case is settled. The Wall Street
Journal is the most dependable and recognizable news media outlet that provided the
researcher with event dates. As discussed in the “Limitations,” the process of identifying the
event date is not without flaws. The event dates identified can be inexact given the tendency
of this information to leak, which one can conjecture based on examples such as Figure M,
which charts Bank of America’s negative cumulative abnormal returns before and after the
event date (discussed further under “Results”). Event dates can also be inexact given the
myriad past news releases for a researcher to sift through. Nonetheless, given the statistically
significant results reached and presented in the “Results” section one can be reasonably
assured that many of the event dates mark major negative events for the corporations sampled.
Once the event date is identified for a certain company, the publicly traded entity’s historical
stock market data is gathered for the 200-day measurement window and the 41-day event
window. All of the historical stock market data for the companies, the competitors, and the
baseline reference – the S&P500 – were collected from Yahoo! Finance. The figures of
primary interest are the adjusted close prices per share of the security, as partially illustrated
for Avon Products in Appendix D, for each day on and around the event date. The adjusted
close figures for the companies are then aligned with the baseline reference adjusted close
data on the same dates. The closing prices per share for each of the 241 days are used to
calculate the stock’s daily returns and the market’s daily returns. With the resulting returns
statistics the researcher can, as explained in the “Event Study” section, use the market model
to determine the stock’s beta coefficient and thus expected returns. By comparing the actual
and expected returns during the 41-day event window, the researcher quantifies the abnormal
returns for 20 days before the event date, the event date, and 20 days after the event date.
Appendix C provides a summary of these abnormal returns in the event window for nine
companies. To draw meaningful results from the sample and to answer the primary research
question, each company’s cumulative abnormal returns in the windows described in the
“Event Study” section are aggregated by calculating an average.
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Industry competitors are deduced from an analysis of each company’s industry. The North
American Industry Classification System (NAICS) is the standard for classifying business
entities according to primary business activities performed. Mergent Online, a global
company database, compiles company and industry profiles. Mergent is used to look up the
companies in the sample and sort industry competitors based on NAICS codes. From a list of
industry rivals, main competitors of the companies are selected based on comparable sales
revenue totals and location of central operations. Ultimately, the main competitor selection is
often imprecise and subject to change and thus reliant on the researcher’s judgement.
Matching companies and competitors with consideration to revenues and target markets
lessens the inexactitude, yet identification of main competitors is still a limitation of the study.
All companies and competitors included in the sample are shown in Appendix I.

After completing the event study procedure for companies and competitors, the researcher
examines the SEC enforcement releases and public documentation relating to the
investigation to ascertain the primary violation and the monetary penalty amount. The
companies and their corresponding violations as categorized by the researcher are organized
in Appendix G. The categories of violation include overstating/understating
revenues/expenses, bribery/ foreign corrupt practices (included as accounting violations
because the bribes are often written off as business expenses), internal control of financial
reporting deficiencies, general improper accounting practices (specific Non-GAAP issues),
and widespread accounting fraud. The companies and their commensurate monetary fines and
disgorgements of ill-gotten gains are shown in Appendix H. In addition, the companies are
sorted by market capitalization in Appendix E. These aspects and characteristics of the
companies and enforcement actions are used to attempt to derive further compelling results.
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RESULTS
The results are organized by companies, competitors, and consequences. The results are, for
the most part, aggregate outcomes from the samples tested for statistical significance.


One asterisk (*) means “statistically significant” at the .05 level.



Two asterisks (**) means “statistically significant” at the .01 level.

Companies
On the date a financial reporting-related SEC probe becomes public knowledge, the targeted
company earns on average negative abnormal returns of 6.13%. In effect shareholders of a
publicly traded business subject to an SEC investigation lose on average 6.13% of their
investment’s value on the day the investigation is revealed. Individual results – segmented
into a few event windows – for the companies targeted are presented in Appendix B.
Combined, these individual results yield average cumulative abnormal returns shown in the
following table:

The results in the three subsequent windows suggest that the probe’s impact on shareholder
wealth is not limited to the event date; rather, the “event” has a lasting impact because the
securities’ returns do not swiftly rebound to the expected levels. The corresponding test
statistics (T-Stats) for the above results are presented in the following table:

In each event window of interest, the outcomes are highly statistically significant. Based on
the t-stats computed, one can infer with 99% confidence that the negative average cumulative
abnormal returns for companies targeted are not due to chance.
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The individual outcomes for Bank of America are worth further discussion for two reasons.
First, the cumulative abnormal returns earned by the firm on and after the event date are
illustrative of the average result for companies in this sample. Second, the cumulative
abnormal returns earned by the firm before the event date are intriguing because information
about the disclosure of negative information concerning Bank of America – the revelation of
an SEC probe – appears to be leaking out before the official announcement and impacting
investment decisions for those with inside information (Appendix M).

Cumulative Abnormal Returns for BAC:

The event’s impact on Avon Products is also included because of the remarkable drop on the
date an SEC bribery probe was disclosed (Appendix N). The result is extreme compared to
the average cumulative abnormal returns of the sample, but it illustrates the precipitous drop
in shareholder wealth that can occur even well before a financial reporting-related
investigation is settled.

Cumulative Abnormal Returns for AVP:

The researcher attempts to derive further takeaways by examining the ultimate consequences
of the probes. The researcher studies all of the enforcement releases, but separating the firms
into several “buckets” based on the primary violation cited and the monetary penalties does
not yield compelling results (Appendix G; Appendix H). This is likely due to the fact that the
ultimate consequences are not known on the event date and thus the violations and the
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penalties do not factor into shareholder responses. In addition the primary violation is based
on the researcher’s judgement from reading the enforcement release; the violation is not
explicitly stated.

An objective firm characteristic does affect the results: size. The size of the company targeted
in the SEC probe does matter. Here size is determined by market capitalization. For the
purposes of this study, “Large Caps” are companies with market capitalizations of $10 billion
or more, “Mid Caps” are those with market capitalizations between $2 billion and $10 billion,
and “Small Caps” are those with market capitalizations of less than $2 billion. Company
information on Yahoo! Finance is used to identify 17 firms (from the sample) as large caps,
12 as mid caps, and 22 as small caps. Appendix E presents the sample sorted by these
designations. Appendix F presents the largely statistically significant aggregate results.

The small cap companies are impacted considerably more negatively by the SEC financial
reporting probes than the mid cap and large cap companies. Average cumulative abnormal
returns were statistically significant in all but one of the event windows. The large caps are
generally just 2 to 3 percentage points below the expected returns. Meanwhile, the returns
from small caps are on average around 10 percentage points below their expected returns.
Each of the three company size “buckets” realizes negative cumulative abnormal returns.
Overall the remarkably negative abnormal returns of the small cap companies bring down the
entire sample’s average. This likely reflects a conception that large companies are established
and relatively financially sturdy and thus an SEC enforcement action is unlikely to damage
the viability of those businesses moving forward. Less information circulates about small cap
companies and less collateral ensures the firm’s continuing prosperity.
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Competitors
This study examines the relationship, in terms of shareholder wealth surrounding an SEC
investigation, between some classic business rivals. The full list of companies and
competitors is shown in Appendix I. In the end the results are not as compelling as the
rivalries themselves would suggest (Appendix J and below).

Average Cumulative Abnormal Returns:

Corresponding T-Stats:

(Not Statistically Significant)

Despite the inconclusive results above, greater variability is noted on the event date. The
standard deviation of the competitors’ abnormal returns on Day 0 compared to the standard
deviations on other event dates suggests that there is some sort of atypical impact on
competitors. Although a simple average may nullify abnormal returns of opposite directions
(positive and negative abnormal returns), the relatively higher standard deviation on Day 0
indicates that the magnitude of abnormal returns for competitors is slightly greater on the date
an SEC probe into a rival is revealed. Further research leads to an intriguing discussion
regarding the United States passenger airline industry.

The US passenger airline industry is a tight oligopoly. United, American, Delta, and
Southwest perform the majority of domestic flights. The airlines are known for being
interdependent and for having fundamentally similar strategic and operational business
models. In fact in 2015 a US Justice Department probe with reference to possible collusion
between the four oligopolistic competitors was revealed. Stock returns for United Continental
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Holdings and American Airlines provide insight into company-competitor effects when
United disclosed a financial reporting-related SEC probe in 2015. Results are shown below
and in Appendix L.

Both stocks took substantial hits and earned negative abnormal returns in the event window
on and following the event date. Of course United, as the target of the SEC investigation and
the eventual recipient of the enforcement action, is further below its expected returns than
American. However, the corresponding negative abnormal returns for American are evidence
that shareholders of American are anxious about similar violations. It shows that in certain
instances an SEC probe can impact both companies and competitors considerably. Further
research relating to the interplay of stock prices between companies and competitors could
yield compelling results for other industries.
Consequences
Appendices G and H exhibit the primary violations and the monetary penalties, respectively,
of each company. Bribery / Foreign Corrupt Practices is the most common primary violation,
indicating a need for multinational corporations to perform more due diligence when
acquiring foreign subsidiaries and to create and maintain more robust internal controls abroad.
Deficiencies in internal controls are cited in nearly every enforcement release. The control
environment, particularly “tone at the top,” is fundamental to a firm’s financial reporting.

Monetary penalties total $909,160,972 for the 46 companies cited in enforcement actions
during the timeframe. Penalties come in the form of civil money penalties paid to the SEC,
profit disgorgement (relinquishment of ill-gotten gains), criminal fines, and prejudgment
interest. Notable penalties include: Computer Sciences Corporation - $190,000,000 civil
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money penalty to SEC; Weatherford International - $140,000,000 civil money penalty;
JPMorgan - $72,000,000 criminal fine, $105,507,668 profit disgorgement, $25,083,737
prejudgment interest.

LIMITATIONS
This study uses accessible historic stock market data; therefore, the quantitative research
findings will be objective and verifiable. Execution of the event study can result in error
because of the technical Excel processes involved and the researcher’s inexperience with this
research method. It is also important to note the inexact process involved in identifying the
“event date” – the date when the SEC financial reporting investigations first become public
knowledge – for the purposes of this study. The date of every financial reporting-related
enforcement action brought by the SEC from April 2014 through March 2017 will be precise
because that information is presented in a day-by-day list on the SEC website. However, the
process of tracking each investigation back to the corresponding disclosure dates, the dates
when the investigations were revealed in one way or another, is less precise and relies on the
researcher’s examination and judgement. The SEC often performs undisclosed probes,
leaving it up to the targeted companies or business-oriented media to disclose the
investigations.

- 20 -

The Impact of Recent SEC Financial Reporting Probes on Shareholder Wealth:
Companies, Competitors, and Consequences
Senior Capstone Project for Stephen Warde
APPENDICES
Appendix A – Companies Subject to SEC Investigations (2014-2017)
Company
OSG - Overseas Shipholding Group
HMST - HomeStreet Inc.
OFIX - Orthofix International
GM - General Motors Company
MDCA - MDC Partners
LLL - L3 Technologies
MDLZ - Mondelez International (Kraft)
BGC - General Cable Corporation
JKHY - Jack Henry & Associates
UAL - United Continental Holdings
JPM - JPMorgan Chase & Co.
FTI - FTI Consulting (FMC Tech)
GSK - GlaxoSmithKline
BUD - Anheuser-Busch InBev
ORRF - Orrstown Financial Services
WFT - Weatherford International
PRK - Park National Corporation
AZN - AstraZeneca
ALOG - Analogic Corporation
IEC - IEC Electronics
CAB - Cabela's
LOGI - Logitech International SA
INTL - INTL FCStone
NVS - Novartis AG
MLNK - ModusLink Global Solutions
MHR - Magnum Hunter Resources
QCOM - QUALCOMM
PTC - PTC Inc.
SCLN - SciClone Pharmaceuticals
SAP - SAP SE
OCN - Ocwen Financial Corporation
SMRT - Stein Mart
RATE - Bankrate
BK - Bank of New York Mellon
CSC - Computer Sciences Corporation
GT - Goodyear Tire and Rubber
OPY - Oppenheimer Holdings
AVP - Avon Products

Release Date
1/23/2017
1/19/2017
1/18/2017
1/18/2017
1/18/2017
1/11/2017
1/6/2017
12/29/2016
12/21/2016
12/2/2016
11/17/2016
10/20/2016
9/30/2016
9/28/2016
9/27/2016
9/27/2016
9/21/2016
8/30/2016
6/21/2016
6/8/2016
4/26/2016
4/19/2016
4/12/2016
3/23/2016
3/15/2016
3/10/2016
3/1/2016
2/16/2016
2/4/2016
2/1/2016
1/20/2016
9/22/2015
9/8/2015
8/18/2015
6/5/2015
2/24/2015
1/27/2015
12/17/2014
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Event Date
8/9/2016
1/13/2017
8/2/2016
3/11/2014
4/28/2015
7/31/2014
2/11/2011
9/22/2014
6/29/2015
2/5/2015
8/19/2013
7/1/2014
6/20/2013
3/25/2013
7/22/2015
3/2/2011
2/28/2012
3/18/2009
12/12/2014
5/20/2013
7/24/2014
5/22/2014
12/17/2013
4/26/2013
6/11/2012
2/15/2013
11/3/2010
7/29/2015
8/10/2010
8/12/2015
8/1/2014
10/22/2013
9/15/2014
1/28/2015
12/12/2013
7/28/2011
6/6/2012
10/27/2011
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CSIQ - Canadian Solar
BRKR - Bruker Corporation
BIO - Bio-Rad Laboratories
GLDD - Great Lakes Dredge and Dock
BAC - Bank of America
SWHC - American Outdoor Brands
(Smith & Wesson)
VISI - Volt Information Sciences
CVS - CVS Health
XOM - Exxon Mobil
BABA - Alibaba Group
TOSBF - Toshiba Corporation
BA - Boeing
IBM - International Business Machines

12/15/2014
12/15/2014
11/3/2014
10/27/2014
9/29/2014

6/1/2010
8/3/2011
5/5/2010
3/15/2013
4/28/2014

7/28/2014
7/25/2014
4/8/2014
Pending
Pending
Pending
Pending
Pending

1/19/2010
11/8/2010
8/2/2013
9/16/2016
5/25/2016
3/17/2016
2/11/2016
10/27/2015
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Appendix B – Abnormal Returns for Companies Targeted

Company
XOM - Exxon Mobil
BABA - Alibaba Group
TOSBF - Toshiba Corporation
BA - Boeing
IBM - International Business Machines
OSG - Overseas Shipholding Group
HMST - HomeStreet Inc.
OFIX - Orthofix International
GM - General Motors Company
MDCA - MDC Partners
LLL - L3 Technologies
MDLZ - Mondelez International (Kraft)
BGC - General Cable Corporation
JKHY - Jack Henry & Associates
UAL - United Continental Holdings
JPM - JPMorgan Chase & Co.
FTI - FTI Consulting (FMC Tech)
GSK - GlaxoSmithKline
BUD - Anheuser-Busch InBev
ORRF - Orrstown Financial Services
WFT - Weatherford International
PRK - Park National Corporation
AZN - AstraZeneca
ALOG - Analogic Corporation
IEC - IEC Electronics
CAB - Cabela's
LOGI - Logitech International SA
INTL - INTL FCStone
NVS - Novartis AG
MLNK - ModusLink Global Solutions
MHR - Magnum Hunter Resources
QCOM - QUALCOMM
PTC - PTC Inc.
SCLN - SciClone Pharmaceuticals
SAP - SAP SE
OCN - Ocwen Financial Corporation
SMRT - Stein Mart
RATE - Bankrate

Event Date (and subsequent trading day
windows) Cumulative Abnormal Returns
Day 0
Day 2
Day 5
Day 20
-0.92%
-2.78%
-2.83%
1.84%
-7.60%
-1.08%
-5.83%
-3.90%
-6.08%
-2.47%
0.85% 16.35%
-5.37%
-5.52%
-4.38%
-1.78%
-3.71%
-2.84%
-2.74%
-2.25%
-7.67% -18.46% -13.88% -12.49%
-6.26%
-5.64%
-9.33% -19.84%
-10.16% -11.02% -10.25%
-7.34%
-4.41%
-5.87%
-3.72%
-3.53%
-28.06% -22.79% -24.42% -23.19%
-10.08% -10.89% -12.04%
-8.78%
-1.74%
-1.67%
-1.49%
1.78%
-3.05% -12.02% -19.66% -23.88%
0.61%
0.22%
0.29%
3.66%
-4.49% -11.08% -10.00% -11.64%
-2.05%
-2.26%
-3.11%
-4.77%
-2.17%
-1.52%
-1.54%
1.29%
-2.47%
-2.93%
-2.28%
-1.24%
-0.44%
-1.27%
0.76%
-1.26%
0.35%
0.86%
3.50%
1.62%
-10.43% -14.62% -13.79%
-9.38%
-2.53%
-5.01%
-6.69%
-6.37%
-4.10%
-4.54%
-6.56%
-5.48%
-0.61%
-3.03%
-0.81%
-2.08%
-13.48% -26.69% -25.42% -30.92%
2.20%
3.49%
6.87% 11.55%
-4.22%
-0.72%
-1.36%
-4.36%
-7.57% -11.54% -12.44% -10.97%
-0.10%
0.16%
-1.12%
-2.75%
-33.01% -29.34% -23.09% -20.50%
-3.52%
1.26% 10.22%
2.98%
0.36%
4.17%
3.24%
4.89%
-2.95%
-6.48%
-5.76%
-5.75%
-28.12% -21.22% -24.63% -17.32%
-0.12%
-1.64%
-1.71%
-2.03%
-7.57% -10.52% -12.40%
-3.96%
-1.03%
1.34%
-0.94%
0.05%
-13.30% -14.17% -12.58% -18.17%
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BK - Bank of New York Mellon
CSC - Computer Sciences Corporation
GT - Goodyear Tire and Rubber
OPY - Oppenheimer Holdings
AVP - Avon Products
CSIQ - Canadian Solar
BRKR - Bruker Corporation
BIO - Bio-Rad Laboratories
GLDD - Great Lakes Dredge and Dock
BAC - Bank of America
SWHC - American Outdoor Brands
(Smith & Wesson)
VISI - Volt Information Sciences
CVS - CVS Health
Average Cumulative Abnormal Returns

-1.57%
-0.58%
-6.65%
-0.23%
-21.24%
-4.84%
-9.29%
-6.79%
-17.70%
-6.67%

0.18%
-0.16%
-4.27%
-5.33%
-21.42%
-24.89%
-12.35%
-8.93%
-21.50%
-6.35%

0.93%
0.56%
-3.70%
-6.93%
-21.40%
-26.92%
-6.04%
-11.91%
-20.89%
-6.73%

3.08%
0.69%
-16.44%
3.27%
-22.26%
-11.68%
-8.10%
-12.39%
-28.68%
-7.26%

0.21%
-0.80%
-0.72%
-6.13%

-0.78%
-11.80%
-3.40%
-7.47%

-0.88%
-17.98%
-3.96%
-7.39%

9.24%
-21.85%
-4.28%
-6.60%

- 24 -

The Impact of Recent SEC Financial Reporting Probes on Shareholder Wealth:
Companies, Competitors, and Consequences
Senior Capstone Project for Stephen Warde
Appendix C – Event Window Samples (Companies Targeted)
Event
Window
-20
-19
-18
-17
-16
-15
-14
-13
-12
-11
-10
-9
-8
-7
-6
-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20

MHR MLNK
QCOM
PTC
ALOG
IEC
CAB
LOGI
INTL
0.75%
0.52%
0.92%
-0.15%
-0.83%
1.40%
1.45%
-7.33%
0.18%
2.34%
2.60%
-0.11%
0.01%
0.00%
1.39%
-0.26%
-0.83%
0.32%
4.02%
0.83%
-0.06%
-0.09%
-0.79%
1.15%
1.38%
-2.61%
0.56%
-1.51%
-1.04%
-1.33%
0.04%
1.43%
0.12%
1.55%
1.24%
0.01%
-6.66%
2.05%
1.04%
0.21%
-1.51%
4.42%
-1.11%
-1.93%
-0.25%
0.29%
1.90%
0.57%
-0.12%
0.92%
-0.49%
0.30%
1.11%
-0.47%
-1.06%
-0.98%
-0.34%
0.15%
-1.01%
-0.52%
0.84%
-0.70%
0.66%
-1.76%
-1.68%
-0.74%
-5.91%
0.72%
-0.50%
0.13%
-1.53%
-0.17%
-0.24%
-1.01%
-1.29%
-1.26%
0.32%
-8.82%
-0.62%
-3.25%
-0.08%
0.31%
-0.11%
0.69%
-0.31%
0.91%
-4.31%
0.07%
-1.41%
-1.50%
0.68%
-0.51%
-0.53%
1.95%
-0.38%
1.40%
-1.73%
0.20%
0.23%
2.09%
-2.48%
-1.07%
-0.54%
0.06%
1.08%
-1.60%
-2.88%
0.65%
1.49%
1.96%
0.24%
-0.91%
-0.52%
0.32%
-2.39%
5.21%
-0.11%
-2.23%
-0.73%
0.14%
-0.04%
1.27%
-1.20%
-0.59%
-1.11%
-0.35%
-2.05%
-2.92%
-0.90%
-0.30%
0.77%
0.12%
-2.49%
-0.92%
-0.16%
-3.17%
-1.37%
1.43%
1.16%
1.36%
-0.15%
1.03%
-1.56%
0.13%
-1.55%
0.04%
-0.25%
-0.71%
-0.47%
-1.07%
1.84%
-1.94%
1.19%
-2.26%
-1.77%
1.68%
0.32%
2.60%
-0.72%
-2.07%
-0.70%
0.23%
0.87%
0.56%
0.28%
0.26% 10.58%
-0.61%
-0.66%
1.34%
0.35%
0.83%
-0.76%
-0.56%
0.16%
3.94%
0.13%
-0.79%
-0.17%
-0.36%
-3.52% -33.01%
0.36%
-2.95%
-0.61% -13.48%
2.20%
-4.22%
-7.57%
1.78%
8.25%
4.18%
-4.11%
-2.40% -15.99%
1.13%
0.64%
-3.16%
2.99%
-4.58%
-0.37%
0.58%
-0.03%
2.78%
0.17%
2.85%
-0.82%
5.82%
-6.91%
-0.94%
0.92%
1.69%
2.57%
-0.11%
0.17%
-2.98%
2.13% 19.66%
0.90%
0.03%
-0.51%
-2.18%
3.88%
-1.00%
-0.14%
1.01%
-6.50%
-0.89%
-0.22%
1.04%
0.89%
-0.39%
0.19%
2.23%
-2.09%
4.95%
0.84%
-0.46%
-0.28%
0.20%
-1.29%
-1.39%
-1.24%
-4.35%
-1.24%
0.02%
-0.15%
-0.43%
-0.70%
0.54%
2.74%
1.06%
-0.50%
-3.83%
-1.18%
0.73%
0.44%
-1.53%
1.12%
2.58%
-0.26%
-3.54% 10.46%
0.28%
0.30%
0.07%
0.06%
0.75%
-0.22%
0.19%
-4.33%
-5.02%
3.41%
-1.79%
2.39%
-2.15%
0.25%
-2.07%
-0.47%
1.50%
-0.24%
-1.84%
-0.32%
-2.57%
-5.47%
-1.57%
-0.26%
1.33%
0.73%
-1.44%
0.27%
0.84%
-0.93%
-0.02%
1.87%
-0.96%
-0.06%
4.70%
-2.88%
-0.20%
0.80%
-1.21%
-0.78%
-0.58%
-0.27%
1.36%
-0.59%
-3.55%
0.07%
0.39%
-0.22%
0.26%
-0.58%
-0.45%
-1.48%
-1.22%
2.42%
0.80%
-0.01%
-0.62%
-1.94%
1.77%
0.95%
0.34%
0.24%
4.13%
-0.17%
-0.43%
0.76%
2.45%
-1.00%
-1.07%
0.38%
-1.64%
1.93%
-0.79%
0.38%
0.05%
4.85%
1.19%
-0.75%
1.04%
2.15%
2.23%
-0.49%
1.84%
0.00%
-0.17%
0.98%
-1.22%
-1.17%
1.25%
-1.23%
0.47%
-0.06%
0.62%
-1.20%
0.55%
-3.36%
3.26%
0.46%
-4.11%
0.17%
-2.05%
0.66%
0.62%
0.68%
2.75%
-2.80%
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Appendix D – Avon Products Event Study Sample

Date
Close
12/13/2010
29.26
12/14/2010
29.22
12/15/2010
29.14
12/16/2010
28.81
12/17/2010
28.84
12/20/2010
29.05
12/21/2010
29.01
12/22/2010
29.11
12/23/2010
29.07
12/27/2010
28.94
12/28/2010
28.93
12/29/2010
28.95
12/30/2010
29.04
12/31/2010
29.06
1/3/2011
29.93
1/4/2011
30.03
1/5/2011
29.65
1/6/2011
30.14
1/7/2011
29.58
1/10/2011
29.39
1/11/2011
29.13
Volume
3247700
2204500
2969100
4339000
4444900
3016700
2932200
2821200
1673100
1209300
1248500
2617100
1542700
1557200
3714600
3526600
3703000
2717300
3401300
2910300
3917200

AVP Adj
Close
25.06748
25.03321
24.96467
24.68195
24.70766
24.88756
24.8533
24.93897
24.9047
24.79333
24.78476
24.80189
24.879
24.89613
25.64147
25.72715
25.40159
25.82138
25.34162
25.17885
24.9561

Date
Close
12/13/2010 1240.46
12/14/2010 1241.59
12/15/2010 1235.23
12/16/2010 1242.87
12/17/2010 1243.91
12/20/2010 1247.08
12/21/2010
1254.6
12/22/2010 1258.84
12/23/2010 1256.77
12/27/2010 1257.54
12/28/2010 1258.51
12/29/2010 1259.78
12/30/2010 1257.88
12/31/2010 1257.64
1/3/2011 1271.87
1/4/2011
1270.2
1/5/2011 1276.56
1/6/2011 1273.85
1/7/2011
1271.5
1/10/2011 1269.75
1/11/2011 1274.48

S&P 500
Volume Adj Close
4.36E+09 1240.46
4.13E+09 1241.59
4.41E+09 1235.23
4.74E+09 1242.87
4.63E+09 1243.91
3.55E+09 1247.08
3.48E+09
1254.6
1.29E+09 1258.84
2.52E+09 1256.77
1.99E+09 1257.54
2.48E+09 1258.51
2.21E+09 1259.78
1.97E+09 1257.88
1.8E+09 1257.64
4.29E+09 1271.87
4.8E+09
1270.2
4.76E+09 1276.56
4.84E+09 1273.85
4.96E+09
1271.5
4.04E+09 1269.75
4.05E+09 1274.48

Intercept
Slope (beta)

S&P 500
Adj Close

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20

Measure
ment
Window

-0.00188
0.925096

AVP Adj
Close

0.0911%
-0.5122%
0.6185%
0.0837%
0.2548%
0.6030%
0.3380%
-0.1644%
0.0613%
0.0771%
0.1009%
-0.1508%
-0.0191%
1.1315%
-0.1313%
0.5007%
-0.2123%
-0.1845%
-0.1376%
0.3725%

Returns

-0.1367%
-0.2738%
-1.1325%
0.1041%
0.7282%
-0.1377%
0.3447%
-0.1374%
-0.4472%
-0.0346%
0.0691%
0.3109%
0.0689%
2.9938%
0.3341%
-1.2654%
1.6526%
-1.8580%
-0.6423%
-0.8847%
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Appendix E – Companies Sorted by Market Capitalization
Company
QCOM - QUALCOMM
NVS - Novartis AG
SAP - SAP SE
BK - Bank of New York Mellon
XOM - Exxon Mobil
BABA - Alibaba Group
BA - Boeing
IBM - International Business Machines
BAC - Bank of America
CVS - CVS Health
JPM - JPMorgan Chase & Co.
GSK - GlaxoSmithKline
BUD - Anheuser-Busch InBev
AZN - AstraZeneca
GM - General Motors Company
MDLZ - Mondelez International (Kraft)
UAL - United Continental Holdings
PTC - PTC Inc.
CAB - Cabela's
LOGI - Logitech International SA
CSC - Computer Sciences Corporation
GT - Goodyear Tire and Rubber
TOSBF - Toshiba Corporation
BRKR - Bruker Corporation
BIO - Bio-Rad Laboratories
SWHC - American Outdoor Brands
(Smith & Wesson)
WFT - Weatherford International
LLL - L3 Technologies
JKHY - Jack Henry & Associates
RATE - Bankrate
MHR - Magnum Hunter Resources
MLNK - ModusLink Global Solutions
ALOG - Analogic Corporation
IEC - IEC Electronics
INTL - INTL FCStone
SCLN - SciClone Pharmaceuticals
OCN - Ocwen Financial Corporation
SMRT - Stein Mart

Market Cap
Large
Large
Large
Large
Large
Large
Large
Large
Large
Large
Large
Large
Large
Large
Large
Large
Large
Medium
Medium
Medium
Medium
Medium
Medium
Medium
Medium
Medium
Medium
Medium
Medium
Small
Small
Small
Small
Small
Small
Small
Small
Small
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OPY - Oppenheimer Holdings
AVP - Avon Products
CSIQ - Canadian Solar
GLDD - Great Lakes Dredge and Dock
VISI - Volt Information Sciences
FTI - FTI Consulting (FMC Tech)
ORRF - Orrstown Financial Services
PRK - Park National Corporation
OSG - Overseas Shipholding Group
HMST - HomeStreet Inc.
OFIX - Orthofix International
MDCA - MDC Partners
BGC - General Cable Corporation

Small
Small
Small
Small
Small
Small
Small
Small
Small
Small
Small
Small
Small

Appendix F – Market Caps and Average Cumulative Abnormal Returns

Appendix G – Companies Organized by Primary Financial Reporting Violation
Company
QCOM
NVS
SAP
BK
XOM
BABA
BA
IBM
BAC

Primary Violation
Bribery/Foreign Corrupt Practices
Bribery/Foreign Corrupt Practices
Bribery/Foreign Corrupt Practices
Bribery/Foreign Corrupt Practices
General Improper Accounting Practices (GAAP)
General Improper Accounting Practices (GAAP)
General Improper Accounting Practices (GAAP)
"Cooking the Books" - Overstate Revenue
General Improper Accounting Practices (GAAP)
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CVS
JPM
GSK
BUD
AZN
GM
MDLZ
UAL
PTC
CAB
LOGI
CSC
GT
TOSBF
BRKR
BIO
SWHC
WFT
LLL
JKHY
RATE
MHR
MLNK
ALOG
IEC
INTL
SCLN
OCN
SMRT
OPY
AVP
CSIQ
GLDD
VISI
FTI
ORRF
PRK

"Cooking the Books" - Overstate Rev. and Understate Exp.
Bribery/Foreign Corrupt Practices (Hiring)
Bribery/Foreign Corrupt Practices (Business Expense)
Bribery/Foreign Corrupt Practices (Business Expense) IC
Deficiency
Bribery/Foreign Corrupt Practices (Business Expense) IC
Deficiency
Internal Control of Financial Reporting Deficiencies (ICFR)
Bribery/Foreign Corrupt Practices (Business Expense) IC
Deficiency
Internal Control of Financial Reporting Deficiencies (ICFR)
Bribery/Foreign Corrupt Practices
"Cooking the Books" - Overstate Revenue
General Improper Accounting Practices (GAAP)
Wide-ranging Accounting Fraud: Manipulation of Financial
Results
Bribery/Foreign Corrupt Practices
"Cooking the Books" - Understate Expenses
Bribery/Foreign Corrupt Practices
Bribery/Foreign Corrupt Practices
Bribery/Foreign Corrupt Practices
Wide-ranging Accounting Fraud: Manipulation of Financial
Results
"Cooking the Books" - Overstate Revenue
"Cooking the Books" - Overstate Revenue
"Cooking the Books" - Overstate Rev. and Understate Exp.
Internal Control of Financial Reporting Deficiencies (ICFR)
"Cooking the Books" - Overstate Revenue
Bribery/Foreign Corrupt Practices
"Cooking the Books" - Understate Expenses
Internal Control of Financial Reporting Deficiencies (ICFR)
Bribery/Foreign Corrupt Practices
Internal Control of Financial Reporting Deficiencies (ICFR)
General Improper Accounting Practices (GAAP)
General Improper Accounting Practices (GAAP)*
Bribery/Foreign Corrupt Practices
"Cooking the Books" - Overstate Revenue
Internal Control of Financial Reporting Deficiencies (ICFR)
"Cooking the Books" - Overstate Revenue
"Cooking the Books" - Overstate Revenue
General Improper Accounting Practices (GAAP)
"Cooking the Books" - Understate Expenses
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OSG
HMST
OFIX
MDCA
BGC

Internal Control of Financial Reporting Deficiencies (ICFR)
General Improper Accounting Practices (GAAP)
Bribery/Foreign Corrupt Practices (Business Expense) IC
Deficiency
General Improper Accounting Practices (GAAP)
Internal Control of Financial Reporting Deficiencies (ICFR)

Appendix H – Companies and Monetary Penalties
Company
Penalty
QCOM
$7,500,000 Civil Money Penalty to SEC
$21,579,217 Profit Disgorgement; $1,470,887 Prejudgment Interest; $2,000,000 Civil
NVS
Money Penalty to SEC
SAP
$3,700,000 Profit Disgorgement; $188,896 Prejudgment Interest
$8,300,000 Profit Disgorgement; $1,500,000 Prejudgment Interest; $5,000,000 Civil
BK
Money Penalty to SEC
XOM
Pending
BABA
Pending
BA
Pending
IBM
Pending
BAC
$7,650,000 Civil Money Penalty to SEC
CVS
$20,000,000 Civil Money Penalty to SEC
$72,000,000 Criminal Fine; $105,507,668 Profit Disgorgement; $25,083,737 Prejudgment
JPM
Interest
GSK
$20,000,000 Civil Money Penalty to SEC
$2,712,955 Profit Disgorgement; $292,381 Prejudgment Interest; $3,002,955 Civil Money
BUD
Penalty to SEC
$4,325,000 Profit Disgorgement; $822,000 Prejudgment Interest; $375,000 Civil Money
AZN
Penalty to SEC
GM
$1,000,000 Civil Money Penalty to SEC
MDLZ
$13,000,000 Civil Money Penalty to SEC
UAL
$2,400,000 Civil Money Penalty to SEC
$14,540,000 Criminal Fine; $11,858,000 Profit Disgorgement; $1,764,000 Prejudgment
PTC
Interest
CAB
$1,000,000 Civil Money Penalty to SEC
LOGI
$7,500,000 Civil Money Penalty to SEC
CSC
$190,000,000 Civil Money Penalty to SEC
GT
$14,122,525 Profit Disgorgement; $2,105,540 Prejudgment Interest
TOSBF
Pending
$1,714,852 Profit Disgorgement; $310,117 Prejudgment Interest; $375,000 Civil Money
BRKR
Penalty to SEC
BIO
$35,100,000 Profit Disgorgement; $5,600,000 Prejudgment Interest
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SWHC
WFT
LLL
JKHY
RATE
MHR
MLNK
ALOG
IEC
INTL
SCLN
OCN
SMRT
OPY
AVP
CSIQ
GLDD
VISI
FTI
ORRF
PRK
OSG
HMST
OFIX
MDCA
BGC

$107,852 Profit Disgorgement; $21,040 Prejudgment Interest; $1,906,000 Civil Money
Penalty to SEC
$140,000,000 Civil Money Penalty to SEC
$1,600,000 Civil Money Penalty to SEC
$780,000 Civil Money Penalty to SEC
$15,000,000 Civil Money Penalty to SEC
$250,000 Civil Money Penalty to SEC
$1,600,000 Civil Money Penalty to SEC
$3,402,000 Criminal Fine; $7,672,651 Profit Disgorgement; $3,810,311 Prejudgment
Interest
$200,000 Civil Money Penalty to SEC
$150,000 Civil Money Penalty to SEC
$9,426,000 Profit Disgorgement; $900,000 Prejudgment Interest; $2,500,000 Civil Money
Penalty to SEC
$2,000,000 Civil Money Penalty to SEC
$800,000 Civil Money Penalty to SEC
$4,168,400 Profit Disgorgement; $753,471 Prejudgment Interest; $5,078,129 Civil Money
Penalty to SEC
$52,850,000 Profit Disgorgement; $14,515,013 Prejudgment Interest
$500,000 Civil Money Penalty to SEC
$150,000 Civil Money Penalty to SEC
No Monetary Penalty for Company
$2,500,000 Civil Money Penalty to SEC
$1,000,000 Civil Money Penalty to SEC
$500,000 Civil Money Penalty to SEC
$5,000,000 Civil Money Penalty to SEC
$500,000 Civil Money Penalty to SEC
$2,928,000 Profit Disgorgement; $263,375 Prejudgment Interest; $2,928,000 Civil Money
Penalty to SEC
$1,500,000 Civil Money Penalty to SEC
$6,500,000 Civil Money Penalty to SEC

Appendix I – Companies and Competitors
Company
QCOM - QUALCOMM
NVS - Novartis AG
SAP - SAP SE
BK - Bank of New York Mellon
XOM - Exxon Mobil
BABA - Alibaba Group
BA - Boeing

Industry Competitor
DISH - Dish Network
ROG - Roche Holding
ORCL - Oracle Corp.
USB - US Bancorp
CVX - Chevron Corporation
AMZN - Amazon.com
EADSY - Airbus Group SE
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IBM - International Business
Machines
BAC - Bank of America
CVS - CVS Health
JPM - JPMorgan Chase & Co.
GSK - GlaxoSmithKline
BUD - Anheuser-Busch InBev
AZN - AstraZeneca
GM - General Motors Company
UAL - United Continental Holdings
PTC - PTC Inc.
CAB - Cabela's
LOGI - Logitech International SA
CSC - Computer Sciences Corporation
GT - Goodyear Tire and Rubber
TOSBF - Toshiba Corporation
BRKR - Bruker Corporation
BIO - Bio-Rad Laboratories
SWHC - American Outdoor Brands
(Smith & Wesson)
WFT - Weatherford International
LLL - L3 Technologies
JKHY - Jack Henry & Associates
RATE - Bankrate
MHR - Magnum Hunter Resources
MLNK - ModusLink Global Solutions
ALOG - Analogic Corporation
IEC - IEC Electronics
INTL - INTL FCStone
SCLN - SciClone Pharmaceuticals
OCN - Ocwen Financial Corporation
SMRT - Stein Mart
OPY - Oppenheimer Holdings
AVP - Avon Products
CSIQ - Canadian Solar
GLDD - Great Lakes Dredge and Dock
VISI - Volt Information Sciences
FTI - FTI Consulting (FMC Tech)
ORRF - Orrstown Financial Services
PRK - Park National Corporation
OSG - Overseas Shipholding Group
HMST - HomeStreet Inc.

ACN - ACN, Inc.
JPM - JPMorgan Chase & Co.
WBA - Walgreens Boots Alliance
BAC - Bank of America
AZN - AstraZeneca
CABGY - Carlsberg A/S
GSK - GlaxoSmithKline
F - Ford
AAL - American Airlines
CA - CA Inc.
DKS - Dick's Sporting Goods
SNX - Synnex Corp.
LDOS - Leidos Holdings
BRDCY - Bridgestone Corporation
SU.PA - Schneider Electric SA
BIO - Bio-Rad Laboratories
WAT - Waters Corp.
NPK - National Presto Industries
BHI - Baker Hughes Incorporated
RTN - Raytheon
CIEN - Ciena Corp.
MLNK - ModusLink Global Solutions
LINEQ - Linn Energy
RATE - Bankrate
TER - Teradyne
PKE - Park Electrochemical Corp.
MS - Morgan Stanley
SPPI - Spectrum Pharmaceuticals
LEN - Lennar Corp.
CTRN - Citi Trends Inc.
IBKR - Interactive Brokers Corp.
EL - Estee Lauder
BGC - General Cable Corp.
AEGN - Aegion Corp.
NSP - Insperity Inc.
MMS - MAXIMUS Inc.
CCNE - CNB Financial Corp.
FFBC - First Financial Bancorp
CKH - SEACOR Holdings
WAFD - Washington Federal Inc.
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OFIX - Orthofix International
MDCA - MDC Partners
BGC - General Cable Corporation

SNN - Smith & Nephew
IPG - Interpublic Group of Companies
BDC - Belden Inc.

Appendix J – Average Cumulative Abnormal Returns of Competitors

Appendix K – Internal Control Deficiencies: Abnormal Returns of Competitors

Appendix L – Passenger Airline Industry Example
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Appendix M – Bank of America Chart of Abnormal Returns

Cumulative Abnormal Returns
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Appendix N – Avon Products Chart of Abnormal Returns
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